By considering the political effects of the First World War in the whole of the West Midlands (rather than just Birmingham or the Black Country), this article seeks to demonstrate that, although the political culture of the region shifted in terms of behaviours and priorities, many of the features of the late Victorian and Edwardian regional polity survived the 'deluge' of war. The region became less politically homogenous, however, as the pressures of the war and the political responses to these exposed significant differences between the rural counties, the Black Country and the Birmingham conurbation. It concludes that the future political direction of Britain was by no means decided by 1918 and that the electoral results of the first fully democratic election demonstrated that there were many possible alternative choices for a population keen to cement the perceived unity of Britain which was credited for winning the longest and bloodiest struggle since the British Civil Wars.
determined to re-assert his control of the city's political structure after his failure at the National Service Department, faced down a challenge from Arthur SteelMaitland, MP for Erdington and former Conservative Party chairman and took control of the now-united organisation in early 1918. 4 He took this step because he was aware of several challenges which needed to be faced in order to maintain Unionist control of the city. Firstly, the 1918 Representation of the People Act (RPA) had increased Birmingham's electorate from 95,000 to 427,000 and the number of constituencies had increased from seven to twelve. This expanded and redistributed electorate was organised into seats far more class-homogenous than had been the case until December 1910. Secondly, the new electorate included women over the age of thirty for the first time, and Chamberlain needed a centralised organisation to reach out to these new groups. 5 His wisdom in cutting the Gordian knot of Unionist identity in the city is shown by the fact that, although the election was called unexpectedly on 14 November 1918, the Birmingham Unionist Association was able to produce swiftly a series of effective campaigning leaflets (including one titled A word to the Ladies! 6 ) which meant he never had to release his own copy of the 'coupon' in order to win his seat.
7
In addition to the influence of Joseph Chamberlain's socially progressive brand of Unionism, there was also a strong regional tradition of the working class conservatism which was rooted in distrust of middle-call 'faddist' Liberal interference in traditional masculine behaviour, most particularly drinking. Jon Lawrence has identified that in Wolverhampton resistance to liquor control was a potent recruiter to took place on a single day (14 December), although the complexities of organising the voters of servicemen meant that the result was not declared until 28 December.
The electoral campaign was opened by Prime Minister Lloyd George on a visit to
Wolverhampton Town Hall on 23 November 1918 at which he acknowledged 'how much we had to depend upon the Midlands' in the war and where he also first promised 'to make Britain a fit country for heroes to live in' 12 One of Neville Chamberlain's dearest hopes was that the war would see the collapse of old party labels. 16 Chamberlain's dream was shared by others, both within and outside the traditional party limits and across the whole political spectrum and, although it did not come to pass, the fluid politics of the West Midlands which had been produced by the debates over Home Rule and Tariff Reform continued for many years after the war. When it eventually settled into traditional two party politics in the later 1920s, it appeared to do so in a different fashion and according to different agendas than in 1914. This article will argue that the degree of change was relatively superficial, however, and that West Midlands political culture proved remarkably resilient to the challenge of the First World War.
For the majority of the war the West Midlands, like most of Britain, saw little formal party politics in the sense of political meetings and election campaigns. Rather than strictly political issues such as Home Rule and Tariff Reform, the war in the West Midlands was unsurprisingly dominated by the question of living and working conditions. Although campaigns to raise the salaries of servicemen and to improve the pensions of those discharged and the dependents of the dead were sporadically noted, largely through the influence of the NFDDSS, it was the campaign for the improved wages and conditions of workers in reserved occupations that did most to upset the social harmony that was a distinctive feature of pre-war of the war and wages, allowances to dependents of servicemen, and relief paid by the Board of Guardians had not risen to the same extent. In the campaign for the Aston seat in 1918, one speaker commented bitterly that
It had been suggested that on the memorial to the brave men who had fallen should be the words 'their names liveth for evermore' but the mothers of those brave men were expected to live on sixpence a day.
54
When rationing was finally introduced in the town in January 1918, the Trades
Council complained that the scheme had been introduced too late due to the power of the shopkeepers on the City Council. I should be…sorry if at an election we were once more to return to the old controversial and domestic issues which we left behind us in August 1914. I have myself no stomach for fighting battles on subjects many of which are out of date and may be put in the lumber-room of matters past.
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As Laura Beers has somewhat cynically explained, in this way the Unionists were seeking 'to craft a national political rhetoric which would help the party to hold onto power in the era of mass democracy.' 100 This analysis fails to take a sufficiently nuanced view of the spectrum of ideology across the recently unified Unionist party, however. Promises of social reform, often very detailed ones, were common in most Coalition Unionist election addresses. Unionist, Liberal and Labour candidates all recognised that, by taking the 'coupon' they were signing up to Lloyd George's reforming agenda, as well as sharing in the glory of the government's military victory.
If they, as in individual MPs, were forced to give up long-held beliefs, they gladly accepted this as a symbol of the on-going need for mutual sacrifice for the national good which the preceding four years had taught them. As Philip Williamson has convincingly described, the Conservative party increasingly absorbed Whig and Liberal tenets and values as it sought to readjust its position and appeal to a new electoral audience. Some of its leaders, such as Baldwin and Halifax, did so in order to try to act as a genuinely national body, able to put aside class, gender and religious differences and to behave in a fashion which brought peace and reconciliation to a country divided by the demands of war. League of Nations, rather than denominational issues. 106 Although some evidence has been presented to suggest that religion continued to be one of the main determinants of voting behaviour in post-war Britain, in the West Midlands there is little to suggest that it rivalled occupation or gender as a clear influence.
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Perhaps the most distinctive survival from the pre-war days was the fetish for assessing a candidate's 'character'. 108 This measure of an individual's fitness to act as a constituency's MPs involved estimates of the candidate's personal moral and financial probity. It also signified respect for a candidate's willingness to express his views freely, even if these were not shared by a substantial proportion of his electorate or his own political party leaders and managers. The Liberal Unionists had, in the 1880s, prided themselves on their 'manly' independence and resistance to the political demagogues and 'wire-pullers.' 109 These issues were especially germane, given the issuing of the 'coupon', which seemed to suggest to some commentators that the chosen candidate would be an instrument of the Coalition leadership, unable to act for himself. Neville Chamberlain, as has been noted, refused to use the Coalition's official endorsement in his election campaign. In the parish magazine of St Nicholas church in Warwick, vicar of St Nicholas voiced a common concern 'the coming general election will be perhaps the most important we have ever had. The great hope of it is that it will send to Parliament real men, not marionettes.' 110 Coalition-endorsed candidates did attempt to address this criticism, however, such as J. W. Dennis in Deritend who deliberately used the language employed by the Liberal rebels against Gladstone's Home Rule policy thirty years earlier to explain his position:
He did not want to go to Parliament as a delegate….whatever was going to be for the good of the country, as a whole, and for the uplifting of the conditions of the working classes in particular, he should vote for. proportion of whom were serving overseas, thus making any canvassing material hopelessly out of date, but it had also included a redistribution clause which split up constituencies and rendered old loyalties void. 114 The election was also taking place in the midst of one of the worst medical crises of the 20 th century, the influenza pandemic, and many candidates were incapacitated for the duration of the campaign. 115 In these circumstances, voters and candidates complained of an Not all elements of the pre-war political material culture disappeared, however.
Political leaflets remained as important as they had become among a newly literate audience in the Edwardian era, perhaps more so given the limited number of posters that could be produced in time for the hastily called contest. 130 These did begin to evolve however, with leaflets designed to be folded and posted through voters' doors, filled with dates of meetings, advice for voters and attractive electoral slogans employed by successful candidates such as Manville in Coventry.
131
McKibbin suggests that the new political alliance that won the election may have done so by excluding the Labour Party, Trades Unionism and the manual working classes in general, but the evidence on both sides of the political spectrum appears to challenge this assertion. 132 In Birmingham, the victory of Neville Chamberlain's new Association was achieved through a carefully calibrated message that included all sections of the community, except those who, through questioning the war effort, had set themselves outside the pale. Chamberlain may have collaborated with
Milner's BWL, somewhat reluctantly, but Jephcott's candidacy in Yardley was more typical of Chamberlain's vision for the Unionists to become a truly 'national party.' 133 Jephcott was encouraged to emphasise that 'he was a working man and a trade unionist', going on to add that 'it was a disgrace to his party that he was the only candidates. Of course, the emergence of alternative political models to that of the former Liberal Unionists left the Chamberlain family isolated in Birmingham and far less powerful than they had been in the days of 'good old Joe' but this was a process that had begun in 1906 and was merely accelerated by the political consequences of an unprecedented war effort in the heart of England.
